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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
the buyer's rejecting title. Where the proposed buyer is a public
body, does the same rule apply? The Louisiana courts have
never determined whether restrictive covenants would apply
against a public body which acquires and uses the land for a
public purpose. The decisions in other states are conflicting. 24
In one case which came before the Supreme Court, a school
board had agreed to purchase property for use as a school site.
Upon examination of title the property was found to be subject
to a restrictive covenant, which would, if enforceable, restrict
use of the land to residential purposes. The Supreme Court re-
fused to decree specific performance of the purchase agree-
ment.25 The title was "suggestive of serious litigation," and the
court would not undertake to resolve the issue of enforceability
of the restrictions in a matter to which the other landowners
who would be affected by its decision were not parties.
SUCCESSIONS AND DONATIONS
Carlos E. Lazarus*
In Succession of Gaudin,' the First Circuit Court of Appeal
was called upon to decide whether extrinsic evidence establish-
ing the testator's custom of using the slash date form to indicate
month, day and year, in that order, was sufficient as determina-
tive that an olographic testament dated "9/12/55" was actually
dated September 12, 1955. Although the question of whether
extrinsic evidence should be admitted in the first place had
already been decided in the affirmative five years previously
when the case was before the court the first time, 2 it never-
theless took occasion to reaffirm its position on this question
and thus held that extrinsic evidence is not only admissible to
ascertain an otherwise ambiguous date, but that the evidence
adduced by the proponents was sufficient to resolve the am-
biguity.
24. See 2 NICHOLs, EMINENT DOMAIN § 5.73 (3d ed. 1950) ; 18 AM. JU.
Eminent Domain § 157 (1938).
25. Gremillion v. Rapides Parish School Board, 242 La. 967, 140 So.2d 377
(1962).
*Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 140 So. 2d 384 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962),
2. Succession of Gaudin, 98 So. 2d 711 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957), cert. denied
1958.
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Prior to its first decision in 1957, the jurisprudence was
confused and indecisive on the question. The Supreme Court
had announced the rule that an olographic will in which the
slash date form had been used was invalid for lack of a date
certain, the date being an essential part of the testament which
must be determined from the face of the will itself, and which
must be so written as to leave no room for doubt or speculation.
Thus, in Succession of Reird,4 a testament dated "9/8/18" was
held invalid not only because it was impossible to determine
whether the deceased had intended to write September 8th or
the 9th of August, but also because there was no symbol to
denote the century in which the testament was written. 5 And
this, despite the fact that three years previously, in Succession
of Lefort, the court had apparently adopted a position in favor
of extrinsic evidence to resolve ambiguities in the date.6  Sub-
sequently, in Succession of Kron7 the Beird rule seems to have
3. "Certain extrinsic evidence was offered on- behalf of the proponent of the
will, over the objection of the attorney for absent heirs, and the lower court at
first overruled the objection and admitted the evidence, but later reversed itself
and excluded all further proof on that score, holding, as we think correctly, that
the sufficiency of the date must be determined from the face of the will. Heffner
v. Heffner, 48 La. Ann. 1088, 20 South. 281." Succession of Beird, 145 La. 756,
758, 82 So. 881 (1919).
"This court has repeatedly and consistently applied the rule of strict inter-
pretation to wills. It has never departed from the rule laid down in the Code,
that an olographic will, to be valid, must be entirely written, dated, and signed
by the hand of the testator. The date is a vital, essential part of the will. If
there be uncertainty as to its date, a will is void. The date must be so written
by the testator as to leave no room for doubt or speculation." Succession of
Kron, 172 La. 666, 668, 135 So. 19 (1931).
4. 145 La. 756, 82 So. 881, 6 A.L.R. 1452 (1919).
5. "[W]here both the figures intended to represent the day and the month
are less than thirteen, . . . it is impossible to tell whether the deceased in-
tended to write September 8th, or the 9th of August. . . . There is no word
or symbol to denote that part of the year which would tell the century in which
the document was written." Id. at 758-59, 82 So. 881-82.
6. "There is a physical difference between a document without a date and
one with an uncertain date. There is a legal difference between supplying a
missing date, or any part of it, by facts outside of the will, and establishing
certainty concerning an ambiguity or uncertainty or doubt in an existing date.
The former cannot be done, because it is of the essence of the validity of a
will that it be dated 'by the hand of the testator' (C.C. 1588 [1581]), and it
cannot be 'dated' in any other way. But there is no law that prevents the courts
from hearing testimony and entertaining evidence to throw light upon an obscure
date, and remove all doubt, uncertainty, or ambiguity concerning it. Reason
dictates it, and justice demands it, in order that the right accorded by law to
make a will shall be protected, and not defeated by technicalities. Any evidence,
recognized by law and not expressly prohibited calculated to convince the court
and establish the certainty of the date, should be admitted and heard. The whole
question resolves itself into a matter of proof. If the uncertain date can be
made certain by other parts of the will or by any other means, it ceases to be
uncertain and becomes certain and valid. 'Id certum est quod certum reddi
potest.'" Succession of Lefort, 139 La. 51, 78, 71 So. 215, 235-36 (1916).
. 7. 172 La. 666, 135 So. 19 (1931).
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been relaxed. In that case, although apparently honoring the
rule in Beird,8 the court upheld the validity of an olographic
will dated "January 11th/27" by the application of the one
hundred years' presumption of death.9 For the application of
this presumption, however, the court had, of necessity, to permit
extrinsic evidence either of the date of birth or of death of the
testator.
The first Gaudin decision, therefore, was regarded as ap-
parently settling the jurisprudence once and for all, particularly
since the Supreme Court had denied writs, and the question
would merit no further comment but for the fact that in Succes-
sion of Mayer,10 the Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit,
although approving of the Gaudin cases, felt itself bound by
the pronouncements of the Supreme Court in Beird, and held
that an olographic testament dated "10/3/50" was void.1'
Actually, there is no apparent reason why the rule against
the admissibility of extrinsic evidence, assuming such a rule
is a valid one, 12 should have the effect, or should be used for
the purpose of excluding testimony or other evidence tending
to clarify an ambiguity in the testament, be it regarding a
disposition therein or the date on which it was written. As to
the former, Article 1715 of the Civil Code expressly provides
that "When, from the terms made use of by the testator, his
intention cannot be ascertained, recourse must be had to all
8. See note 3 8upra.
9. "The death of a person being presumed, as a matter of law, after the
lapse of one hundred years from the date of his birth, it may likewise be pre-
sumed that he was born not more than one hundred years previous to the date
of his death. If this will was dated in the month of January, 1827, the testator
was more than one hundred years old when he died, for he could not have made
the will the day he was born. Applying this legal presumption, we know therefore
as a matter of law, that this will was not made in the twenty-seventh year of
the century preceding the present one." Succession of Kron, 172 La. 666, 669,
135 So. 19, 20 (1931).
10. 144 So. 2d 896 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
11. "As observed above, we do not feel it is within our province to resolve
the instant case upon the basis of our views, but consider that we are obliged
to follow the pronouncements of the Supreme Court as evidenced by the au-
thorities above noted. In common with the members of the Light Brigade: 'Ours
not to reason why; Ours 'but to do or die.' "Id. at 898-99.
12. Apparently, the rule is an adaptation of the strict French prohibition
against the admissibility of extrinstic evidence to determine the intention of the
testator and which is based on the theory that because of the gratuitous and
unilateral nature of the disposition, it would be dangerous to resort to evidence
outside the instrument itself to arrive at a fair interpretation thereof. See 5
PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANcAIS, no 18, Inter-
prdtation des libdralitdu 19-21 (1933).
But then, the. French Code contains no articles corresponding to Articles
1714-1716 of the Louisiana Civil Code, and, moreover, the rule in France. has
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circumstances which may aid in the discovery of his intention. '13
As to the latter, it is not a question of whether the testator
intended to date the testament on a particular month and day,
or a particular day and month, but whether the date as written
actually means one or the other, and for this purpose, no good
ground either in reason or in logic can be advanced for exclud-
ing evidence tending to resolve the uncertainty or ambiguity. 14
As the court correctly states in Gaudin, Article 1588 of the
Civil Code does not demand that the date of an olographic
testament be written by a particular method; all it requires is
that it be dated in the hand of the testator, and the authority
for the reception of proof necessary to ascertain the meaning
thereof is clearly authorized by the Code itself.15
Although writs had been granted in the second Gaudin case,
they were dismissed on joint motion so that the Supreme Court
will not have the opportunity to pass upon the questions pre-
sented. In this connection, it is to be regretted also, that no
writs were applied for in Succession of Mayer.
been relaxed for the purpose of permitting extrinsic evidence to resolve ambiguities
in an existing date. Ibid.
13. See also LA. CIvIL CODE art. 1714 (1870): "In case of ambiguity or
obscurity in the description of the legatee, as, for instance, when a legacy is
bequeathed to one of two individuals bearing the same name, the inquiry shall
be which of the two was upon terms of the most intimate intercourse or con-
nection with the testator, and to him shall the legacy be decreed."
Id. art. 1716: "A mistake in the name of an object bequeathed is of no
moment, if it can be ascertained what the thing was which the testator intended
to bequeath."
14. No one would dispute that if a death certificate annexed to the pleadings
showed that the testator died on November 5, 1962, for example, his will, dated
"6/11/62" could only have been written on June 11, 1962, for it would have
been a physical impossibility for him to have written it after his death.
15. Cf. Sophie v. Duplessis, 2 La. Ann. 724 (La. 1847) in which the court
states: "The only requisites for the validity of a nuncupative testament under
private signature, are prescribed in articles 1574 and 1575 of the Code, and
among these the date and place where it is passed are not enumerated. It is
expressly declared that such testaments are subject to no other formality than
those declared in those articles; and courts can require the observance of no
others. Reasons have been suggested why it is important to fix the date of the
testament, and place where it was received. The facts may be shown by evi-
dence on the probate of the will." Id. at 726. See also Succession of Lombardo,
205 La. 261, 17 So. 2d 303 (1944) to the effect that although a nuncupative
will by public act might be invalid as such if the date thereof is not made part
of the body of the act, it may nevertheless be valid and upheld as a nuncupative
will under private signature.
If extrinsic evidence may thus be adduced to prove the date upon a nuncupa-
tive will by private signature the date of which is incomplete, as was the situa-
tion in Duplessis, supra, why should the rule be any different in the case of an
olographic testament bearing an ambiguous date?
It is not being suggested, however, that a testament that does not have a
date should be valid. The question as to the dating of testaments will be the
subject of a future article in this Review.
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A related question was presented in Succession of Bendily,11
involving an olographic testament in which there was question
whether the year in which it was written was 1938 or 1958.
Although the trial court had concluded that the numeral "5"
had been surcharged or superimposed over the numeral "3",
making the date clearly 1958, the appellate court reversed,
being unable to determine from an examination of enlarged
photographs whether the year was one or the other. The court
was constrained to hold that the numeral in question was un-
certain, undecipherable, and non-apparent. 1 7
Succession of Lewis'5 involved a sample printed form of a
will supplied to members of the armed forces in which the
testator had completed some of the blanks designating his step-
son as legatee. On the marign of the form he had also made
other dispositions, written and signed in his own hand. The
purported will, said the court, was clearly null and void on its
face, as it failed to meet any of the requirements for any one
of the various kinds of wills authorized by law. As to the
olographic dispositions on the margin, the court had no dif-
ficulty in concluding that they were null for lack of form since
they were undated.
In Condon v. McCormick, 9 a nuncupative testament by pri-
vate signature was attacked on the grounds, among others, that
it was so unintelligible as to show no testamentary intent or
disposition, and that it was not signed or executed as required
by law. It appeared from the testimony that, prior to the execu-
tion of the will, the testator had suffered a stroke, as a result
of which he was left partially paralyzed and unable to speak;
that the instrument had been confected by one of the witnesses
who elicited the necessary information by interrogating the
testator who would nod his head in assent to the questions pro-
pounded; and that, being physically incapable of signing his
name, the testator was assisted by one of the witnesses in
making his mark.
20
16. 132 So. 2d 693 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
17. The court further finds, however: "There is further grounds to believe
on observing the questioned date that there are two numeral 3's superimposed,
one on the other. . . . Id. at 698-99. If this was so, could not the court have
justified a conclusion that the date was "1938"?
18. 140 So. 2d 791 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
19. 134 So. 2d 619 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
20. See Succession of Seals, 174 La. 275, 140 So. 476 (1932) to the effect
that under Articles 1581 and 1582 of the Civil Code, there is no express require-
[Vol. XXIII
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Although the instrument was not as clear as it might have
been, the court found it sufficiently intelligible and expressive
of the decedent's intent to dispose of the only piece of property
he owned in favor of the named legatees. As to the other grounds
of attack, the court noted that the testament had been prepared
by one of the witnesses in the presence of the testator and of
the witnesses; that it had been read to all of them in the pres-
ence of the testator and of each other; and that the testator
had assented thereto. It concluded, therefore, that there had
been a substantial and sufficient compliance with the formali-
ties prescribed by Articles 1581 and 1582 of the Civil Code, and
that therefore, the testament was valid.
Innocuous as it may appear, this decision goes much further
than the court possibly intended to go, for it upholds the validity
of a will in the making of which one of the essential formalities
required was not observed, namely, the dictation of the testa-
ment by the testator to the amanuensis, unless it can be said
that the mute assent by the testator to questions propounded
by the witness who wrote the testament is the equivalent of a
dictation. It should be noted, however, that this point does not
appear to have been raised, nor discussed by the court. Never-
theless, it is clear from the terms of Article 1581 of the Civil
Code that the nuncupative will by private signature, when con-
fected in the presence of the witnesses, must be either dictated
by the testator to one of them, or written by the testator himself
in their presence. 21 True it is that no other formalities than
those prescribed by Articles 1581 and 1582 of the Code for this
kind of testament are required. On the other hand, it is apparent
that nothing short of strict compliance with these formalities
will satisfy the provisions of the Code, and that substantial
compliance is not enough.
22
ment that the testator must make his mark in case he knows not or is unable
to sign his name.
21. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1581 (1870): "A nuncupative testament, under
private signature, must be written by the testator himself, or by any other person
from his dictation, or even by one of the witnesses, in presence of five witnesses
residing in the place where the will is received, or of seven witnesses residing
out of that place.
"Or it will suffice, if, in the presence of the same number of witnesses, the
testator presents the paper on which he has written his testament or cause it
to be written out of their presence, declaring to them that that paper contains
his last will." (Emphasis added.)
22. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1595 (1870) : "The formalities, to which testaments
are subject by the provisions of the present section, must be observed; otherwise
the testaments are null and void." (Emphasis added.)
19631
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In Succession of Rockvoan23 the Court of Appeal for ' the
Fourth Circuit extended the Sizeler v. Sizeler214 rule to a retire-
ment-system contract whereby the system undertakes to pay a
specified sum on the death of the member to the beneficiary
designated by him. While not holding that such a contract is
a contract of insurance, the court nevertheless finds it so closely
analogous as to warrant an application of the rules governing
insurance contracts. Accordingly, the beneficiary of the death
benefit was held to prevail over the executrix of decedent's
succession who contended, inter alia, that the designation of
the beneficiary in the application made by the deceased con-
stituted a donation either inter vivos or mortis causa and as
such, void for lack of form. Winsberg v. Winsberg,25 on which
the executrix relied, to the effect that the designation of a
beneficiary by the purchaser of a United States savings bond to
whom the bond was to be paid upon the death of the purchaser
constituted a donation mortis causa, was properly distinguished
and held inapplicable. 26
The important point at issue in Heintz v. Gilbert27 was the
validity of a sale whereby the vendor conveyed to his son his
one-half interest in the community previously existing between
him and his deceased wife. The sale had been made for a recited
consideration of $1,000 cash "and the further consideration of
being allowed the right and occupancy [sic] of said property
during the period of his [the vendor's] natural life." The lower
court, whose opinion the appellate court adopted as its own,
held that since at least part of the recited cash consideration
had actually been paid, there was no simulation. It also found,
however, that since the recited consideration of $1,000 was con-
siderably less than one-fourth the appraised value of the prop-
erty, the sale could, under Article 2444 of the Civil Code,
properly be attacked as a donation in disguise; the court refused
to attach any importance to the contention that the vendor had
23. 141 So. 2d 438 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
24. Sizeler v. Sizeler, 120 La. 128, 127 So. 388 (1930), to the effect that
the proceeds of a life insurance policy, when payable to a designated beneficiary,
form no part of the estate of the insured but inure to the beneficiary directly
and by the sole terms of the contract itself.
25. 220 La. 398, 56 So. 2d 730 (1952).
26. The essential difference being that whereas in Winsberg, the bonds be-
longed to and were at all times in the possession of the purchaser, the death
benefit in question did not at any time belong to the member of the system, and
only passed to the designated beneficiary, by virtue of the contract, upon the
death of the member.
27. 140 So. 2d 518 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
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also been given the right of occupancy of the property sold-2&
Having concluded that the transaction was a donation, the court
found it void not only because it was not in authentic form as
required by Article 1536 of the Civil Code, 29 but also because
it contained a reservation of the usufruct in favor of the donor
and thus violated Civil Code Article 1533.30
If by the right of occupancy was meant the right of habita-
tion which is defined by the Code as the "right of dwelling
gratuitously in a house the property of another person"' and
which is limited to what is necessary for the habitation of the
person to whom the right is granted, 2 a different result might
have obtained if the ascertainable value of the right which by
the terms of the contract was given "as a further consideration"
for the sale had been taken into account in determining the
price paid for the property.8 3 It is apparent, however, that the
court interpreted the contract as a sale of the naked ownership
minus the right of habitation, or as it summarily concluded,
minus the usufruct, which was reserved in favor of the vendor.
Here again, it would seem that a distinction could have been
made 4 between the right of usufruct which a donor is pro-
28. "The Court doesn't attach any importance to the defendant's argument
in his brief that the vendor, Charles H. Heintz was given the right of occupancy
of said property during his lifetime. Charles H. Heintz did not sell the right
of occupancy of said property and the Court doesn't see how this right could be
part of the consideration. It could not be part of the consideration of something
he did not sell. The court finds that the purported sale from Charles H. Heintz
to Jared Y. Heintz, dated January 20, 1955 was in fact, a donation in disguise."
Id. at 522.
29. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1536 (1870) : "An act shall be passed before a notary
public and two witnesses of every donation inter vivos of immovable property or
incorporeal things, such as rents, credits, rights or actions, under the penalty of
nullity."
30. Id. art. 1533: "The donor is permitted to dispose, for the advantage of
any other person, of the enjoyment or usufruct of the immovable property given,
but can not reserve it for himself."
31. Id. art. 627.
32. Id. art. 641: "The right of habitation is confined to what is necessary
for the habitation of the person and of the family of the person to whom the
right of use or habitation is granted .. "
33. Although the terms of the contract are not fully set forth in the opinion,
the portion thereof which is quoted indicates that the price paid for the prop-
erty was the recited cash consideration, plus the value of the right of occupancy
or habitation.
34. Id. art. 635: "The right of use of a house and that of habitation being
alike, are subject to the same rules."
Id. art. 633: "That which distinguishes the usufruct of a property from the
use of it, is this, that the enjoyment of the usufructuary is not confined to what
is necessary for his consumption, but he takes all the fruits, and can dispose of
them as he pleases.
"The person, on the other hand, who has only the use of an estate, has a
right only to such fruits as may be necessary for his daily wants and those of his
family."
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hibited from 'reserving to himself, and a right of habitation
which is a less extensive one, and which may well not be included
within the prohibition of Article 1533 of the Civil Code. 35
In Smith v. Huckaby'36 a surviving husband brought suit to
annul the succession proceedings whereby the natural son of
his deceased wife had caused himself to be recognized as the
sole heir of his mother and, by an ex parte judgment, sent into
possession of her separate property which he later sold for
$3,500. Plaintiff's position was that since under Article 926 of
the Civil Code the "putting in possession of the natural children
shall not be pronounced without calling the relations of the
deceased, who would have inherited in default of the natural
children," the succession proceedings, as well as the subsequent
sale of the property, were invalid. Conceding, arguendo, that
the husband in this case was such a relation within the con-
templation of the article cited,3 7 the court nevertheless held that
since he had signed the affidavit of heirship in the succession
proceedings, he was effectively estopped to deny the validity
of the judgment of possession. 38 Aside from the interesting
35. Under Article 949 of the Code Napoleon, which corresponds to LA. CIVIL
CODE art. 1533 (1870), the donor is permitted to reserve for his own advantage
the enjoyment or usufruct of movables or immovables given. The same was true
in Louisiana under Article 50, p. 221, of the Code of 1808. Why the rule was
changed is briefly explained by the redactors of the Code of 1825 as follows:
"The reservation of the usufruct in favor of the donee [sic] would produce the
disadvantage of concealing from the eyes of the public the change of property
which had taken place. He who wishes to enjoy during his life a piece of prop-
erty which he destines for another, can give it by last will, and it is not easy
to perceive the use of a donation inter vivos, with reserve of usufruct." 1 Lou-
ISIANA LEGAL ARcHIVES, PROJET 209 (1937). And cf. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1550
(1870). See also Creech v. Errington, 207 La. 615, 21 So. 2d 761 (1945), in
which a clause in a purported act of sale constituting the vendor as the agent
and attorney in fact of the vendee, to have and control the property sold during
the vendor's lifetime, with plenary authority to collect and disburse all income
therefrom, was interpreted as giving the alleged vendor the right of usufruct.
Note the language of the court: "For the donor to have and control said prop-
erty during his lifetime, collecting and disbursing all income therefrom as it
might seem just and right to him, means, in our opinion, that donor was to
enjoy the property during his lifetime, with full power to collect or draw from
the property all the profit, utility, and advantages which it might produce; or, in
other words, to collect and disburse all income as might seem just and right to
him, meaning the right to collect and disburse all income 'as he may see fit' or
to collect and then disburse same to his own use, benefit and enjoyment, he being
the sole and only judge as to what was 'just' and 'right.' " Id. at 622, 21 So. 2d
761, 763. (Emphasis added.)
36. 141 So. 2d 72 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
37. The report indicates that the decedent's father and mother had predeceased
her, and there is no indication whether she had any other living relations who
would have excluded the husband in default of her natural child. Id. at 72.
38. "Conceding the necessity of calling in those relations who would inherit
in default of the natural child and that the surviving spouse is such a relation
within the contemplation of the codal article, defendants set up in their answers
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question whether the apparently mandatory provisions of Ar-
ticle 926 of the Civil Code can thus be waived, the question still
remains whether, had he refused, the vendee could have been
compelled, in a suit for specific performance, to accept the title
tendered to him by his vendor.3 9
In Succession of Quartarro4 ° the court, for the first time,
interpreted the 1948 amendment of Article 1705 of the Civil
Code as meaning that a testament falls by the subsequent adop-
tion of a person by the testator, whether the person adopted is
a minor or a major. The court clearly explained that the person
adopted acquires the status of an heir, no matter what his age
might be, and thus dismissed as unsound the argument advanced
that by the use of the word "child" in the amendment, the legis-
lature intended to limit the article to the adoption of minors.
And in Daigle v. Fournet4 ' the court applied Article 1740 of
the Civil Code and permitted the plaintiff to recover his engage-
ment ring from the defendant when the latter broke off their
engagement to be married. This was but a clear application of
the rule expressed in the article that a donation made in con-
templation of marriage is void if the contemplated marriage
does not take place.
CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS
J. Denson Smith*
GENERAL
If a person conditions the assumption of an obligation on a
subsequent exercise of his will, he does not actually obligate him-
self. Article 2034 of the Civil Code recognizes this fact by stat-
ing that such an obligation is null. The potestative condition to
to plaintiff's original and amended petitions the special defense of estoppel. This
defense is predicated upon plaintiff's execution of an affidavit wherein he at-
tested to the status of Clarence Huckaby as an acknowledged natural child which
affidavit was made a part of the succession proceedings and made a basis of
judgment in those proceedings. This judgment of possession constituted the basis
of the subsequent sale of the property to Tony Greco, co-defendant herein. Plain-
tiff, therefore, in effect was a party to the proceeding of which he now attacks.
These factual circumstances present a clear case of sustaining the plea of
estoppel." Id. at 74.
39. Cf. Wimberly v. King, 179 So. 515 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1938).
40. 139 So. 2d 277 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 1962.
41. 141 So. 2d 406 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
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